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INTRODUCTION
For over the last three decades, the United States Supreme Court
has consistently held that officials at public colleges and universities
must operate within the confines of the First Amendment, and are thus
generally precluded from impinging upon the fundamental rights of
college and university students to freedom of speech and freedom of
the press.1 Nonetheless, in June, 2005, the Court of Appeals for the
∗

J.D. candidate and Certificate in Litigation and Alternative Dispute
Resolution candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S. cum laude, June 2004, Northwestern University, Medill School of
Journalism. Julia R. Lissner is deeply indebted to the following individuals for their
comprehensive input on this Comment: Professor Hal R. Morris, John G. New,
Barbara C. Long, and Julie Ann Sullivan.
1
See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (university officials
constitutionally prohibited from denying funding to religious student magazine
based on content); Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (state university’s
expulsion of student for disseminating student newspaper that officials deemed
indecent was unconstitutional); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (universities
cannot refuse to recognize controversial campus groups or speakers); see also, e.g.,
Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983) (university acted unconstitutionally
by attempting to restructure funding to student newspaper because of controversial
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Seventh Circuit rendered a decision that runs contrary to the spirit of
the Supreme Court’s precedent and the Court’s commitment to
protecting free speech at institutions of higher learning.2 In Hosty v.
Carter,3 a 7-4 decision en banc, the Seventh Circuit extended the
Supreme Court’s high school-specific standard set forth in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier4 to review a student newspaper
censorship claim at Governors State University (“GSU”), a public
university in Illinois.5 The decision en banc overturned the earlier
judgment of a unanimous three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit that
held that, given the more than 30 years of law providing strong First
Amendment protection to the college student press, the Hazelwood
standard was limited to primary and secondary education.6 In addition,
the majority in the decision en banc discounted the significance of
Hazelwood’s footnote seven, in which the Supreme Court stated that it
“need not now decide whether the same degree of deference [to the
decisions of high school administrators] is appropriate with respect to
school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”7
issue); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975) (university could not censor
student newspaper and dismiss student editors for alleged poor grammar and
spelling); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) (university may not
withdraw support for student newspaper because university disagrees with views
expressed in publication); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973)
(university may not prevent publication and distribution of student yearbook on
grounds that publication contained language that is “inappropriate and in bad taste”);
Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968) (university acted
unconstitutionally by suspending editor of student newspaper editor for contentrelated reasons).
2
See Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) en banc.
3
Id.
4
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (permits high
school administrators to censor school-sponsored speech if their actions are
supported by “legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
5
Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 731.
6
Id.; Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated,.
7
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7.
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This Comment will contend that the Seventh Circuit erred in
extending the Hazelwood analysis to college and university campuses
absent more direction from the Supreme Court. Section I will recount
the Hazelwood decision and detail the Hosty litigation. Section II will
compare the Seventh Circuit’s analyses to how other circuit courts
have interpreted and applied the Hazelwood holding. Section III will
examine the differences in age and maturity level between high school
and college students, as well as the distinct missions of their respective
educational institutions. Section IV will further discuss the difficulties
in reconciling the Hosty decision en banc with Supreme Court
precedent relating to subsidized funding and prior restraints.
I. HAZELWOOD AND ITS APPLICATION BY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier is a unique, fact-specific
holding that is distinguishable from the college newspaper censorship
claim at issue in Hosty v. Carter. In the 1988 Hazelwood decision, the
Supreme Court held that high school administrators have broad
powers to censor school-sponsored newspapers if their actions are
supported by “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”8 However, the
Supreme Court explicitly left open the question of whether this First
Amendment standard is appropriate with respect to censoring college
student speech9— as was the issue before the Seventh Circuit in
Hosty.10
A. Pre-Hazelwood Decisions
The Supreme Court decisions leading up to Hazelwood, namely
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District11 and

8

Id. at 261.
Id. at 273 n.7.
10
See generally. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) en
banc,
11
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
9
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Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,12 evince an important
distinction between school-sponsored speech, and speech that merely
occurs on campus. This distinction is critical to understanding the
Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision, and is now at issue in
evaluating the Seventh Circuit’s Hosty decision en banc.
Before the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood in 1988, the Court
applied the “material and substantial interference” standard to evaluate
educational decisions challenged on First Amendment grounds.13 As
the Court explained in the 1969 case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, a school can permissibly
censor its students where student conduct “materially and substantially
interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.”14 In Tinker, the court held that the high
school officials acted unconstitutionally in suspending students who
refused to remove armbands symbolizing their disapproval of the
Vietnam War.15 The Court stated that the record failed to evidence any
facts which might have reasonably led school officials “to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities” when the students donned the armbands, and that “no
disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred.”16
Yet, the Supreme Court narrowed the Tinker standard in the 1986
case of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.17 In Bethel, the Court
held that the First Amendment does not prevent schools from
determining when lewd and vulgar speech undermines the school's
basic educational mission, and that it is “perfectly appropriate for the
school to disassociate itself” from this sort of speech.18 In particular,
the Court found that the Bethel high school acted properly by
imposing a two day suspension on a student who gave a lewd speech
12

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510.
14
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
15
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
16
Id.
17
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 675.
18
Id. at 685.
13
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at a school assembly.19 The Court explained that a high school
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue
directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.20
The significance of Tinker and Bethel in understanding the
Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision, and in now evaluating the
Seventh Circuit’s Hosty decision en banc, is that the Supreme Court in
Bethel drew a distinction between the speech in Tinker and Bethel.21
Notably, the acceptable speech at issue in Tinker was a political
message that did not intrude upon the mission of the schools or the
rights of other students, whereas the censorable speech at issue in
Bethel was the sexual content of a school assembly speech that
undermined the school's basic educational mission.22 Thus, the Court
marked the emergence of a distinction between school-sponsored
curricular speech, and speech that merely occurs on campus.23
B. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
This curricular/non-curricular distinction later resonated through
the Court’s 1988 Hazelwood decision.24 Hazelwood involved a high
school student newspaper, written in the course of and as a curricular
component of a high school journalism class.25 The high school’s
curriculum guide described the class, titled Journalism II, as a
“laboratory situation in which the students publish the school
newspaper applying skills they have learned in Journalism I.”26 The
teacher oversaw the style and content of the high school newspaper,

19

Id. at 686.
Id. at 685-86.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See id.
24
See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
25
Id. at 268.
26
Id.
20
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and was required to submit proof pages to the high school’s principal
before publication.27
Hazelwood arose after the principal objected to two articles
awaiting publication in the high school newspaper: one story reporting
on three high school students’ experiences with pregnancy, and a
second story describing the impact of divorce on students at the
school.28 The principal objected to the pregnancy article due to
concern that pregnant students might be identifiable from the text
(though unidentified by name), and that “the article’s references to
sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the
younger students at the school.”29 The principal objected to the
divorce article because an identified student disparaged her father in
the article, and the article’s author did not provide the father an
opportunity to respond to his daughter’s remarks.30 Believing that
there was no time to alter the stories before the paper went to press,
the principal withheld the two pages of the issue that contained these
two stories in dispute.31
In response to the principal’s decision, a journalism student sued
the school district on the grounds that the principal violated her First
Amendment rights by withholding the two pages from publication.32
Despite this claim, the Supreme Court ruled that the principal acted
reasonably in finding that the two articles were unsuitable for the high
school newspaper because the students were not operating in a public
27

Id.
Id. at 263.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 263-64. The Court stated:
The two pages deleted from the newspaper also contained articles
on teenage marriage, runaways, and juvenile delinquents, as well
as a general article on teenage pregnancy. [The principal] testified
that he had no objection to these articles and that they were deleted
only because they appeared on the same pages as the two
objectionable articles..
Id. at 264 n.1.
32
Id. at 264.
28
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forum and thus the school could reasonably curtail the students’ First
Amendment rights.33 The Court explained that the high school’s
facilities may be deemed to be public fora only if school authorities
have by policy or by practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate
use by the general public, or by some segment of the public, such as
student organizations.34 However, if the facilities have instead been
reserved for other intended purposes, “communicative or otherwise,”
such as a curricular, instructional environment, “then no public forum
has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable
restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of
the school community.”35 The Court explained that a school “does not
create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse,”
as in a journalism class for example, but rather “only by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”36
The Supreme Court, accordingly, held that the high school
principal’s actions did not offend the journalism students’ First
Amendment rights, because: (1) the newspaper was produced by a
journalism class and had not been opened by the school as a public
forum for student expression; (2) as a nonpublic forum, school
officials would be allowed to censor such student speech if their
actions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns;”
and (3) the principal’s objections to the articles were reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.37 What is more, the Court
limited its holding in the case to censorship of student media in lower
education, and dropped a footnote explicitly explaining that the Court
did not intend for its “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test to extend
to higher education:
33

Id. at 276.
Id. at 267 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460
U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
35
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
36
Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
37
Id. at 270-72, 274; see Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P.
Barba, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377).
34
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FN7. A number of lower federal courts have similarly
recognized that educators' decisions with regard to the
content of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic
productions, and other expressive activities are entitled
to substantial deference. We need not now decide
whether the same degree of deference is appropriate
with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities
at the college and university level.38
With this footnote, the Court explicitly left open the question of
whether the Hazelwood First Amendment standard is appropriate with
respect to censoring college student speech,39 and such now becomes
the crux of the controversy with respect to the Seventh Circuit’s
decision en banc in the case of Hosty v. Carter.40
B. Hosty v. Carter
1. From “Innovators” to Litigators
In January, 2001, three student journalists, proceeding pro se,
sued officials at Governors State University, alleging prior restraint
violations of their First Amendment rights.41 Editor Margaret Hosty,
Managing Editor Jeni Porche, and Staff Reporter Steven Barba filed
suit after the Dean of Student Affairs and Services Patricia Carter
ordered their newspaper’s printer to hold future issues of the
publication until a school official could give approval to the paper’s
contents.42 The university student newspaper, the Innovator, had
occasionally published news stories and editorials critical of the
38

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis

added).
39

Id.
Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) en banc,
41
Id.; Hosty v. Carter Information Page, Student Law Press Center,
http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=49 (last visited April 14, 2006).
42
Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 733.
40
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administration.43 Dean Carter issued the directive for prepublication
review despite the public university’s policy that student newspaper
staff “will determine content and format . . . without censorship or
advance approval.”44
On August 30, 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois allowed the students’ case to go forward, denying
the university’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim.45 Then, on November 15, 2001, on motion for summary
judgment, the federal district court held that all university officials
named in the suit— except Dean Carter— were entitled to qualified
immunity.46 The court cited a question of fact as to the dean’s actions
in halting future publication of the Innovator.47
Shortly thereafter, Dean Carter appealed the decision of the
district court.48 In support of her interlocutory appeal, Illinois Attorney
General Jim Ryan asked the Seventh Circuit to apply and extend the
Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision— which set forth the standard
under which high school administrators could permissibly censor
school-sponsored speech— to the university context.49
2. First Draft: Seventh Circuit’s Three-Judge Panel
On April 10, 2003, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit
issued a decision in favor of the college free press, and unanimously
upheld the district court’s refusal to grant summary judgment in favor

43

Id. at 732, 742. The articles included report on university’s decision not to
renew teaching contract of newspaper’s faculty advisor, and commentaries critical of
other university officials, including the dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. Id.
44
Id. at 744.
45
Hosty v. Governors State Univer., 174 F. Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
46
Hosty v. Governors State Univer., No. 01 C 500, 2001 WL 1465621, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2001) (rev’d by Hosty II, 412 F.3d 731).
47
Id. at *7.
48
See generally Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003),
49
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.
2003) (No. 01-4155).
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of Dean Carter.50 The panel, composed of Judges Coffey, Rovner, and
Evans ruled that college and university students possess greater press
freedoms than high school students, and refused to grant qualified
immunity to Dean Carter.51 Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge
Evans explained that “qualified immunity protects government
officials performing discretionary functions when their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”52 The panel rejected
Dean Carter's argument that she could not reasonably have known that
it was illegal to order the Innovator’s printer to halt publication of the
newspaper or to require prior approval of the newspaper's content in
light of the existing, well-established law.53 In particular, the
unanimous panel emphasized the more than three decades of precedent
supporting First Amendment protections across college and university
campuses, and thus declined to extend the Supreme Court’s
Hazelwood standard for censoring high school speech to apply to the
college student media censorship claim at issue in the case.54
In response to the decision, Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan filed a petition on behalf of Dean Carter for a rehearing en
banc.55 Rehearings en banc are generally rare and not favored by the
courts; as such, they require a majority of the circuit judges who are in
regular active service to order the rehearing by the full court.56 A
rehearing en banc will typically only be ordered when consideration
by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its
decisions, or when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional

50

See generally Hosty I, 325 F.3d 945.
Id. at 949 (general view is to favor “broad First Amendment rights for
students at the university level”).
52
Id. at 947.
53
Id. at 948.
54
See generally id.
55
Petition of Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter for Rehearing with
Suggestions for Rehearing en banc, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-4155).
56
See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
51
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importance.57 In support of the Hosty rehearing en banc, Madigan
argued that the three-judge panel overlooked previous decisions that
demonstrate that the law governing free speech rights for college and
university students is not clearly established.58
On June 25, 2003, a majority of the active Seventh Circuit judges
granted the petition for a rehearing en banc and vacated the unanimous
judgment of the three-judge panel.59 Despite the arguments put forth
by Madigan, the Seventh Circuit likely ordered the rehearing because
the case involved a “question of exceptional importance”: notably, the
extension of a Supreme Court standard applied to First Amendment
censorship claims.60 On its face, the case appears to be merely a
procedural posture— an appeal of a summary judgment decision
denying Dean Carter qualified immunity.61 However, beneath the
surface, the outcome of the case could possibly define and inhibit
college student speech both within the Seventh Circuit, and through
the rest of the country because of its interpretation and application of
the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision.62
This underlying question of extending the Supreme Court’s high
school-specific holding in Hazelwood, and applying it in the university
context (as in Hosty), should— and likely will— come before the
Supreme Court for clarification due to the lack of direction from the
Court in Hazelwood (most specifically in footnote seven).63 Thus it is
possible that the Seventh Circuit granted the rehearing en banc in
order to set forth a more deliberate decision to submit to the Supreme
Court so that the Court may fully elucidate its Hazelwood standard
with respect to college student speech. Whereas the unanimous
57

Id.
Petition of Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter for Rehearing with
Suggestions for Rehearing en banc, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-4155).
59
See Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 945.
60
See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
61
Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 945.
62
Id.
63
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988); but
see Hosty v. Carter, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (Mem.) (Feb. 21, 2006) (denying certiorari on
Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) en banc.).
58
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decision of the three-judge panel was neither blatantly wrong, nor
undermining of the uniformity of Seventh Circuit decisions, the threejudge panel’s ruling was somewhat sparse, in that it did not explicitly
address Hazelwood’s footnote seven and did not address any sort of
forum analysis.64 For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit may have
granted the rehearing en banc in order to better satisfy the Supreme
Court by putting forth a more comprehensive analysis on this issue
that will likely go before the high court at some point for much needed
clarification.
3. Editing the Story: Seventh Circuit’s Decision En Banc
On January 8, 2004, an eleven-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit
sat en banc to rehear oral arguments.65 The full panel handed down a
decision, on June 25, 2005, supporting the university, and starkly
opposing the previous decision of the original three-judge panel.66 In a
seven-judge majority, the Seventh Circuit extended the Supreme
Court’s Hazelwood decision to the collegiate level, yet declined to
define the First Amendment rights of college journalists.67 With
regards to the Hazelwood footnote in which the Supreme Court left
open the issue of extending the “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test
to the college and university setting, the Seventh Circuit majority
contended that the “footnote does not even hint at the possibility of an
on/off switch: high school papers reviewable, college papers not
reviewable. It addresses degrees of deference.”68 The majority
opinion, written by Judge Easterbrook, further asserted that
Hazelwood’s framework depends in large part on the public-forum
analysis, and (in contrast to the vacated decision of the unanimous
three-judge panel) does not necessarily vary depending upon the
64

See Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 945.
Hosty v. Carter Information Page, Student Law Press Center,
http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=49 (last visited April 14, 2006).
66
Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 744.
67
Id. at 735.
68
Id. at 734.
65
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speakers’ age/level of education, or upon the distinction between
curricular and extracurricular activities.69 Judge Easterbrook cited the
possibility that some “high school seniors are older than some college
freshmen,” and also declared that many “junior colleges are similar to
many high schools.”70
The majority concluded that the Innovator did not participate in a
traditional public forum because the newspaper received student
funding, and because “[f]reedom of speech does not imply that
someone else must pay.”71 Relying upon the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Rust v. Sullivan72 and National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley,73 the majority stated that Hazelwood’s framework for free
speech analysis applies to subsidized student newspapers at
elementary and secondary schools, as well as subsidized student
newspapers at colleges and universities, like the Innovator at GSU.74
Further, the majority suggested that even if GSU created a “designated
public forum” or “limited-purpose public forum” for the Innovator,
Dean Carter is still entitled to qualified immunity for damages because
she could not have reasonably known that the limitations of the
Hazelwood judgment and because she should not be held liable for
“constitutional uncertainties.”75
69

Id. at 738.
Id. at 734-35 (“The Supreme Court itself has established that age does not
control the public-forum question. See generally Symposium: Do Children Have the
Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?, 79 CHI.-KENT L.REV. 3 (2004) (including
many articles collecting and discussing these decisions)”).
71
Id. at 737.
72
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (family planning restrictions did not
violate free speech rights of Title X funding recipients by imposing conditions on
government medical subsidies).
73
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (statute
requiring National Endowment of the Arts to consider decency and respect when
judging grant applications did not violate artists’ First Amendment rights because
statute not directly aimed at regulating speech).
74
Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 735.
75
Id. at 737. However, the Innovator was published by the GSU Student
Communications Media Board, which was made up of four students, two faculty
members, and one civil service or support employee of the university. The Board
70
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In contrast, the dissent of Judges Rovner, Williams, Wood, and
Evans contended that the majority’s conclusion stemmed from the
“incorrect premise - that there is no legal distinction between college
and high school students.”76 Writing for the dissent, Judge Evans77 set
forth two reasons why the law draws a distinction between high school
and college level students: 1) high school students are less mature than
their college counterparts, and 2) the missions of their respective
institutions are different.78 The dissent concluded that “no pedagogical
concerns can justify suppressing the student speech” in this case
because the Supreme Court created Hazelwood for the “narrow
circumstances of elementary and secondary education.”79 In addition,
the dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority’s holding that Dean
Carter is entitled to qualified immunity since decisions prior to
Hazelwood consistently established that university officials cannot
“require prior review of student media or otherwise censor student
publications.”80 The dissent explained that neither Hazelwood, nor
post-Hazelwood decisions, changed this well-established rule, and that
Dean Carter “violated clearly established First Amendment law in
censoring the student newspaper.”81
4. Further Revisions Necessary

laid down the rules for publication and established that “each funded publication will
determine content and format . . . without censorship or advance approval.” Id.
76
Id. at 740 (Evans, J. dissenting). Judge Coffey, who ruled in favor of the
student journalists at the first hearing, evidently changed his position and ruled in
favor of the university at the rehearing en banc.
77
Judge Evans also wrote the decision for the original three judge panel. See
Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated,
78
Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 740 (Evans, J. dissenting).
79
Id. at 739, 744 (Evans, J. dissenting).
80
Id. at 742 (Evans, J. dissenting).
81
Id. at 743-44 (Evans, J. dissenting).
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On September 16, 2005, the student journalists filed a petition for
writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.82 The Illinois Attorney
General’s office declined to respond to the students’ petition, which
prompted the Supreme Court to specifically request that the office file
a response.83 Some legal commentators have viewed this as favorable
for the student journalists because the Supreme Court typically only
asks for a response if the Court believes that the petition likely has
merit.84 Thus, this request demonstrated the high court’s interest in the
case, and arguably illustrates that the Hosty decision en banc is worthy
of review.85
5. BREAKING NEWS: Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied
On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court denied the student
journalists’ petition for writ of certiorari.86 However, this denial does
not establish that Seventh Circuit correctly extended the Hazelwood
analysis and that the decision en banc is not worthy of skepticism by
the legal community. If anything, it may suggest that the Supreme
Court wishes to wait and see how more circuit courts will interpret the
Hazelwood standard in future cases.
Inevitably, the Supreme Court will have to accept a petition for
writ of certiorari on this issue of whether the Supreme Court’s
Hazelwood standard for addressing censorship claims relating to high
school speech can be extended to censorship in higher education. This
is a critical First Amendment controversy, stemming from the Supreme
82

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377).
Supreme Court requests response in Hosty case, Student Press Law Center
(2005), http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1115 (last visited April 14, 2006).
(“‘Although your office has waived the right to file a response to the petition for a
writ of certiorari . . . The Court nevertheless has directed this office to request that a
response be filed,’ stated a letter from the Supreme Court clerk to the Illinois
Attorney General’s office dated Oct. 27, 2005.”)
84
Id. (quoting excerpt from Supreme Court Practice faxed to Student Press
Law Center by Supreme Court’s public information office).
85
Id.
86
.Hosty v. Carter, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (Mem.) (Feb. 21, 2006).
83
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Court’s own elaboration of a standard for addressing high school
censorship claims, and further confused by the Court’s inclusion of
footnote seven which leaves the door open with respect to a standard
for evaluating college censorship claims.87 The lack of direction from
the Supreme Court up to this point has greatly confused the circuit
courts, as evidenced in the Hosty decisions, and has led to a circuit
split.88 Thus, even though the Court has now declined to hear Hosty,
First Amendment jurisprudence requires the high court to clarify the
underlying issue of the case. For the reasons set forth in the remainder
of this Comment, once the Supreme Court does accept a petition for
writ of certiorari on the issue of applying the Court’s Hazelwood
analysis in the university context, the Court should establish that
Hazelwood does not apply in higher education, as the Court halfheartedly tried to establish by dropping footnote seven in its
Hazelwood decision.
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OVERLOOKS
CURRICULAR/NON-CURRICULAR SPEECH DISTINCTION AND
ERRONEOUSLY APPLIES FORUM ANALYSIS
The Hosty decision en banc conflicts with the Hazelwood
interpretations of several other circuit courts.89 Whereas circuit court
decisions have reflected the growing confusion in extending the
Hazelwood analysis to institutions of higher learning, no circuit has
interpreted the Supreme Court decision to extend to such lengths as
the Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc— notably non-curricular
speech in an institution of higher education.90 Specifically, several
87

Cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988).
See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li,
308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001);
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Student Gov. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Trs., 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989).
89
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260; Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342; Student Gov.,
868 F.2d at 473.
90
See, e.g., Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1277; Brown, 308 F.3d at 939; Kincaid,
236 F.3d at 342; Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1066; Student Gov., 868 F.2d at 473.
88
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circuits have declined to extend Hazelwood’s high-school specific
analysis to evaluate censorship of college student speech,91 and the
circuits that have extended Hazelwood have limited their holdings to
curricular speech in higher education.92
In the nearly two decades since the Supreme Court set forth its
“legitimate pedagogical concerns” test in Hazelwood, circuit courts
have for the most part been reluctant to extend Hazelwood to the
university realm.93 For instance, the First Circuit implicitly declined to
extend Hazelwood in Student Government Association v. Board of
Trustees, on the grounds that Hazelwood “is not applicable to college
newspapers.”94 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, in Kincaid v. Gibson,
explicitly declined to extend Hazelwood into the university context,
holding that university officials violated the First Amendment rights of
two college yearbook editors by confiscating and refusing to distribute
the student-published yearbook.95 The Second Circuit explained that
Hazelwood has little application in Kincaid because forum analysis
requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited (or designated)
public forum rather than a nonpublic forum.96 Because the yearbook
was a limited public forum, university officials did not impose
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions by confiscating all
copies of the yearbook on the grounds that the quality was lacking.97
The few circuits that have applied Hazelwood to the college
environment are factually distinguishable from Hosty because the
speech at issue was exclusively free speech rights within the
classroom, and thus would not be thought of as a public forum or

91

See Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342; Student Gov., 868 F.2d at 473.
See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1277; Brown, 308 F.3d at 939; Bishop, 926
F.2d at 1066.
93
See, e.g., Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342; Student Gov., 868 F.2d at 473.
94
Student Gov., 868 F.2d at 480 n.6.
95
Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 347.
96
Id. at 346 n.5.
97
Id. at 354-56.
92
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limited public forum.98 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit suggested
that Hazelwood has some relevance at the college level in such limited
circumstances as religious speech in the classroom environment.99 The
circuit court explained in Bishop v. Aronov that university classrooms
do not operate as public fora during instructional periods because they
are reserved for the limited purpose of teaching a particular university
course for academic credit.100 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit, in AxsonFlynn v. Johnson, chose to extend Hazelwood to address college
speech at issue in the case because the speech occurred as part of a
mandatory curricular assignment during class time and in the
classroom.101 The Tenth Circuit explained that the classroom of the
university’s actor training program constituted a nonpublic forum,
where university officials could regulate speech in any reasonable
manner; and that the classroom could not reasonably be considered a
traditional public forum, or a designated public forum, absent more
direction from the university authorities.102 Yet, the Tenth Circuit
explicitly recognized “that some circuits have cast doubt on the
application of Hazelwood in the context of university extracurricular
activities,” and that their Axson-Flynn decision did not need to put
forth analysis on this distinction because of the exclusively curricular
speech at issue in the case.103 The Ninth Circuit is also cited, though
less frequently, for extending the Hazelwood analysis to the university
realm in Brown v. Li.104 However, the Ninth Circuit’s extension of
98

See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li,
308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
99
Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071. Bishop held that a memo instructing a university
professor to refrain from interjecting religious beliefs during instructional periods
did not infringe professor’s free speech rights. Id. at 1078.
100
Id. at 1071.
101
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290. Axson-Flynn held that an acting student at
the university could be required to say script lines that conflict with the student’s
Mormon faith as part of the curriculum. Id.
102
Id. at 1285.
103
Id. at 1287 n.6.
104
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002). Brown held that a masters
student did “not have a First Amendment right to have his nonconforming thesis
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Hazelwood is extremely narrow— only one judge on the three-judge
panel explicitly approved of the application of Hazelwood, while
another judge explicitly disproved of the Hazelwood application.105
Still, the one judge to rely on the Hazelwood ruling qualified his
application by stating that “[we] do not know with certainty . . . that
Hazelwood controls the inquiry into whether a university's
requirements for and evaluation of a [graduate] student’s curricular
speech infringe that student’s First Amendment rights.” 106
In contrast to the facts of both Hazelwood and cases where circuit
courts have applied the Hazelwood analysis, Hosty does not involve
curricular speech.107 Rather, the GSU college student newspaper was
an autonomous extracurricular activity and not part of the university’s
curriculum.108 The Innovator was overseen by a Board made up of
“four students, two faculty members, and one civil service or support
employee of the university.”109 The Board set up rules for publication,
and determined that the Innovator would establish “its content and
format . . . without censorship or advance approval from the
administration.”110 Furthermore, Dean Carter’s complaints were not
pedagogical in nature111 (as to render the objections falling under
Hazelwood’s “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test) and a university
approved, nor did he have a right to a formal hearing with respect to his committee's
academic decision not to approve the thesis.” Id. at 955.
105
Id. at 950 (one judge writing opinion, one judge concurring, and one judge
partially concurring, partially dissenting).
106
Id. at 951.
107
Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); AxsonFlynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown, 308 F.3d at 939; Bishop
v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) with Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d
945, 946-47 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Lueth v. St. Clair, 732 F. Supp. 1410, 1412
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (declining to apply Hazelwood because high school student
newspaper was not part of curriculum and not under principal’s ultimate authority).
108
See Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2005) en
banc.
109
Id. at 737.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 733. GSU officials complained that articles in the Innovator were
irresponsible and defamatory journalism. Id.
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should not suppress student speech merely because it dislikes editorial
comments.112 Thus, because several circuits have refused to extend
Hazelwood to apply to college level speech, and because the Hosty
decision en banc is factually distinguishable from the circuit courts
that have applied Hazelwood to the university realm, the Seventh
Circuit likely erred in extending the Supreme Court decision to assess
the censorship claims involving non-curricular speech in higher
education.
Moreover, the Hosty decision en banc is grounded upon an
“overly mechanistic application of public forum analysis,” 113 as
opposed to the curricular/non-curricular distinction, discussed
above.114 Rather than relying on the “longstanding presumption that
student media is not merely a public forum but an independent forum,”
the Seventh Circuit majority instead examined whether the GSU
student newspaper was operating in a public forum, a non-public
forum, or a closed-forum.115 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit’s forum
analysis is likely inappropriate with respect to the GSU students’
censorship claim which involved an extracurricular college student
newspaper. To compare, in Hazelwood, there was an actual need to go
through this forum analysis due to the question of whether or not the
high school student newspaper was a public forum because it was also
part of a class curriculum.116 Such was also the case in the Ninth,
112

See Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that
university's president violated First Amendment by irrevocably withdrawing
financial support from official student newspaper that had segregationist editorial
policy).
113
Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Support for
Academic Freedom as Amicus Curia in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330
(2006) (No. 05-377).
114
See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001); Student
Gov. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989); Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1287 n.6 (10th Cir. 2004).
115
Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Educ., et. al, and Supp.
for Academic Freedom in Supp. of Pet’rs, Hosty, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (05-377).
116
Greg Lukianoff & Samantha Harris, FIRE Policy Statement on ‘Hosty v.
Carter,’ Foundation for Individual Rights in Education,
http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/6269.html (last visited April 14, 2006).
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Tenth, and Eleventh circuit court decisions, discussed above, that
extended the Hazelwood standard to assess censorship claims relating
to curricular speech in higher education.117 In addition, the Supreme
Court found the forum analysis necessary in Hazelwood because there
was concern that the two questionable student articles might be viewed
as being endorsed by the high school.118 However, in Hosty, the
Seventh Circuit was not pressed to go through a forum analysis— the
court was presented with the classic college student newspaper
operating as an extracurricular activity, and freedom of student presses
is generally presumed without the need to elaborate upon a forum
analysis.119 Thus, rather than engaging in the overly-complicated
forum analysis, the Seventh Circuit should have first evaluated the
student journalists’ censorship claim through a simple factual
examination of whether the Innovator constituted a curricular or
extracurricular publication.
Yet, even if the forum analysis was necessary in deciding whether
there was a First Amendment violation in Hosty, the decision en banc
should have still found a violation on the GSU students’ First
Amendment rights. After reviewing the record, it appears likely that
the Innovator was operating in a public forum.120 The student
newspaper was an extracurricular activity, governed by a Board who
established its rules for publication and who explicitly determined that
the Innovator would “determine its content and format without
censorship or advance approval from the administration.”121 Hence,
117

See Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d at 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Bishop v. Aronov, 926
F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1277.
118
See Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petition of Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of
Certirari, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377).
119
See Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003); see also , e.g.,
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (“if a college has a student
newspaper, its publication cannot be suppressed because college officials dislike its
editorial comment”); Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342 (college student yearbook is a limited
public forum).
120
See Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2005).
121
Id. at 737.
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this university policy explicitly created a public forum for
indiscriminate use by the student newspaper organization.122 However,
even if the Innovator operated in a limited (or designated) public
forum, as discussed by the decision en banc, the Second Circuit’s
Kincaid decision suggests that the Seventh Circuit should have still
held that Hazelwood is inapplicable to assess the GSU students’
censorship claim.123 If the Innovator operated in a limited (or
designated) public forum, like the yearbook in Kincaid, then the GSU
student newspaper could only be permissibly limited by reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions, and thus Dean Carter still would
not have been permitted to abruptly halt the presses at whim.124
Therefore, the forum analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s decision en
banc remains questionable in light of the extracurricular college
speech at issue in the case, and the GSU policy apparently opening the
forum for indiscriminate use by Innovator’s staff.
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OVERLOOKS
HIGH SCHOOL/COLLEGE DISTINCTION
Although the majority in the Hosty decision en banc asserted that
Hazelwood provided their “starting point,”125 the Seventh Circuit also
improperly extended that Supreme Court’s decision by ignoring the
fundamental distinctions between high school and college students,
and the different missions of the respective institutions— both of
which Judge Evans noted in the vacated decision of the three-judge
panel and in his dissent to the decision en banc.126 Instead of engaging
in a forum analysis like the majority in the decision en banc, the
original panel and the dissent of the decision en banc found this
122

See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing
Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
123
See Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342.
124
Id.
125
Cf. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 734.
126
See id. at 743-44 (Evans, J. dissenting); Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d
945 (7th Cir. 2003).
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analysis to be inapplicable to deciding the facts presented before them,
as they were charged with ruling upon the First Amendment rights of
highly educated adults in a historically free and open educational
institution.127
A. The Hosty decision en banc ignores the relevant age and maturity
distinctions between high school and college students.
The majority in the Hosty decision en banc failed to regard the
important dichotomy between high school student speech and college
level speech.128 The courts have consistently looked to this distinction
in determining constitutional freedoms, and this distinction
underscores the fundamental inapplicability of extending Hazelwood
into the university context.129 “[T]he status of minors under the law is
unique in many respects,” and age (for which grade is a good
indicator) has been a tool the courts have regularly used to define legal
rights.130
The Supreme Court has explained that the First Amendment rights
of elementary and secondary students in the public schools “are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”
and thus must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the
educational environment.131 In particular, in Hazelwood, the Supreme
Court emphasized the emotional immaturity of high school-age
127

See Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 743-44 (Evans, J. dissenting); Hosty I, 325 F.3d at

948.
128

See Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1982)
(stating that “[d]ifferent considerations govern application of the First Amendment
on the college campus and at lower level educational institutions [and that] activities
of high school students” may be reviewed more stringently than those of college
students because “the former are in a much more adolescent and immature stage of
life and less able to screen fact from propaganda”).
129
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
130
See Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 740 (Evans, J. dissenting); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (“during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them”).
131
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 682.
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students, and specifically explained that “a school must be able to take
into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially
sensitive topics.”132
Though Hazelwood informs the courts that younger students in a
high school setting must endure First Amendment restrictions, nothing
in that case changes “the general view of favoring broad First
Amendment rights for students at the university level.”133 College
students are distinguishable from high school students because college
students are more mature, rational and independent thinkers.134
“According to the U.S. Census Bureau, only one percent of those
enrolled in American colleges and universities in 2000 were under the
age of 18,” and over half of those enrolled are over the age of 22.135
University students are not children; they are young adults, and are
less impressionable than elementary and secondary school students.136
As the three-judge panel in the original Hosty decision explained,
treating college and university students “like 15-year-old high school
students and restricting their First Amendment rights by an unwise
extension of Hazelwood [is] an extreme step for [the Seventh Circuit]
to take absent more direction from the Supreme Court.”137 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit’s Hazelwood application in the university setting
undermines the distinction between high school and college students,
and infantilizes some of the most mature students in our nation’s
132

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988) (citing
potentially sensitive topics such as the existence of Santa Claus and discussions of
teenage sexual activity).
133
Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73.
134
See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (upholding federal law
that provided funding to church-related colleges and universities for construction of
facilities for secular educational purposes; noting that pre-college students may not
have the maturity to make their own decisions on religion, and that college students
are less impressionable).
135
Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 740 n.1 (Evans, J. dissenting); see also Hosty I, 325
F.3d at 948-49.
136
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686.
137
Hosty I, 325 F.3d at 949.
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educational system.
B. The Hosty decision en banc ignores the distinct mission
of higher education.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc additionally
underestimates the special importance that the Supreme Court has
placed on free and open exchange in higher education.138 The Supreme
Court has long recognized that the college classroom with its
surrounding environs is the paradigmatic “marketplace of ideas.”139
Colleges and universities seek to expose adult students to a wide range
of viewpoints and strive to facilitate vibrant debates of “philosophical,
religious, scientific, social and political subjects in [both their
classrooms and] their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture
hall.”140 In contrast, primary and secondary schools have a custodial
and tutelary responsibility for their young students.141 Elementary
schools and high schools constitute a principal instrument in
“awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust more normally to
his environment.”142
The Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc ignores the longrecognized and long-supported relationship between higher education
138

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
139
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233
(2000).
140
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231. “[Wisconsin] law defines the University's
mission in broad terms: ‘to develop human resources, to discover and disseminate
knowledge, to extend knowledge and its application beyond the boundaries of its
campuses and to serve and stimulate society by developing in students heightened
intellectual, cultural and humane sensitivities . . . and a sense of purpose.’” Id. at
221.
141
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 823 (2002) (holding that Fourth
Amendment rights are different in public schools than elsewhere).
142
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (citing
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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and free speech,143 and thus extending Hazelwood at the university
level risks the suppression of ideas and creative inquiry that is so vital
to the nation’s intellectual life.144 This decision could have a snowball
effect or, yet worse, a “tsunami effect”— spawning censorship of any
school-sponsored student activity, and requiring students to gain prior
approval in the realm of student government, theater, speakers, films,
and a host of other expressive activities that are traditionally weaved
into university life.145 In addition, the disastrous consequences of
applying Hazelwood to the university context could “extend outside
the ivy-covered walls.”146 A Hazelwood regime at the college level
could turn “college newspapers into the timid house organs that most
high school newspaper have [now] become.”147 Post-Hazelwood
studies evidence “that high school newspapers suffered a severe
chilling effect” after the high court’s decision and that students
avoided covering controversial issues.148 At the college level, this
“chilling effect” could further hinder the flow of ideas to the offcampus readership, and also “chill” students’ post-college/on-the-job

143

See Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279, 282 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
public university may not constitutionally take adverse action against a student
newspaper such as withdrawing or reducing the paper’s funding because it
disapproves of the content of the paper).
144
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (decided eight years after
Hazelwood and involving challenge to university’s refusal to sponsor a Christian
student group with funds intended to support a broad range of extracurricular student
activities that are related to educational purpose of institution).
145
Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition of Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of Cert.,
126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377).
146
Brief for the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Commcation and the Association of Schools of Journalism and Mass Commcation as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377).
147
Id.
148
Id. (citing Carol S. Lomicky, Analysis of High School Newspaper Editorials
Before and After Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: A Content Analysis Case
Study, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 462 (2000)).
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reporting by interfering with campus newspapers’ “recruitment and
training of tomorrow’s professional journalists.”149
Fortunately, college and university officials in the states
composing the Seventh Circuit have not yet used the Hosty decision en
banc as an absolute license to censor, and instead many universities
have employed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling as a platform to advocate
for the college free press.150 In particular, the administrators at four
public colleges/universities151 in the three states composing the
Seventh Circuit have formally designated their school’s student
newspapers as public fora— explicitly enabling student editors to
make all content decisions without the threat of censorship or
necessity for prepublication approval from the universities.152 Most
recently, administrators at Illinois Central College have shielded their
students from the Hosty decision en banc by declaring that students
149

See Brief for the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Commcation and the Association of Schools of Journalism and Mass Commcation as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377).
150

Amicus Curia briefs were filed by two dozen media organizations, First
Amendment organizations, and journalism education organizations, including
colleges and universities. See, e.g., Answer of Student Press Law Center and Amici
Listed on Reverse Side as Amici Curiae in Response to Defendant-Appellant Patricia
Carter’s Petition for Rehearing with Suggestions for Rehearing en banc, 325 F.3d
945 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-4155); Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education and Support for Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377).
151
The Public Forum List, Student Press Law Center,
http://www.splc.org/publicforumcolleges (last visited April 14, 2006). (Illinois State
University, University of Southern Indiana, University of Wisconsin Platteville
operate in public fora; University of Illinois’s daily student newspaper is fully
independent of the school and a public forum statement is therefore unnecessary);
Matthew Chayes, College paper’s editors given control over content, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, March 30, 2006 at p.4 (Students at Illinois Central College will have final
say over what is published).
152
University of Southern Indiana president signs public forum statement,
Student Press Law Center, http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1070 (last visited
April 14, 2006); The Public Forum List, Student Press Law Center (2005),
http://www.splc.org/publicforumcolleges (last visited April 14, 2006).
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will have the final authority over the student newspaper decisions.153
However, there remain over 80 public colleges and universities in this
region, and countless private schools, that have yet to follow suit, and
it is unfortunate that such lengths need to be taken by educational
institutions that have historically operated as free and open fora that
encourage and promote a diversity of viewpoints.154 But unless the
administrations of all colleges and universities in the Seventh Circuit
states follow this sort of example and explicitly declare that the
publications are public fora,155 the suspect forum analysis of the Hosty
decision en banc will still threaten the college free press and still
undermine the fundamental mission of higher education.
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT FURTHER MISAPPLIES
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Hazelwood is a factually-distinct standard that is problematic to
apply outside the specific context in which it arose— that of
curricular, high school speech.156 Hence, once the Seventh Circuit
majority decided to extend Hazelwood to non-curricular speech in
higher education, the court’s suspect decision-making did not stop
there. Instead, the majority’s logic in the Hosty decision en banc
continued to fly in the face of Supreme Court precedent, as the

153

Matthew Chayes, College paper’s editors given control over content,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, March 30, 2006, at p.4. A faculty adviser at Illinois Central
College threatened to shut down the campus paper after the student editors resisted
the advisor’s demands to control the content. Id.
154
The Public Forum List, Student Press Law Center,
http://www.splc.org/publicforumcolleges (last visited April 14, 2006).
155
See id. (The Student Press Law Center is encouraging students in Illinois,
Indiana and Wisconsin to call upon their schools to pledge their commitment to free
speech by explicitly designating their student media as “public fora” where student
editors have the right to make editorial decisions free from administrative
interference).
156
See Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petition of Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of
Certiorari, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377).
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Seventh Circuit misapplied the high court’s analysis regarding
subsidized funding and prior restraints.
A. The Hosty decision en banc confuses student fees and
government subsidies.
The Seventh Circuit appears to have also ignored the critical
distinction between funding from mandatory student fees and
government subsidies.157 The Hosty decision en banc transformed
student money into government money— “forc[ing] students to pay
into a student activities funds earmarked for a student-run newspaper
only to have [the funds] used to finance an administrati[ve]
mouthpiece.”158 Because the Innovator was an extracurricular activity
supported by student activity fees,159 “[t]he Seventh Circuit directly
contradicted Supreme Court precedent by applying doctrines relevant
to institutionally ‘subsidized’ speech.”160
In particular, the Seventh Circuit improperly treated the
mandatory student activity fees as a conventional governmental
subsidy, diametrically opposed to the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions.161 Under the high court’s analyses in Board of Regents v.
Southworth162 and Rosenberger v. Rector,163 student fees are
157

See Greg Lukianoff & Samantha Harris, FIRE Policy Statement on ‘Hosty
v. Carter,’ Foundation for Individual Rights in Education,
http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/6269.html (last visited April 14, 2006).
158
Brief for The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Supp. for
Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330
(No. 05-377).
159
Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 2003).
160
Brief for The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Supp. for
Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330
(No. 05-377)
161
Id.
162
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233
(2000) (group of students challenged use of mandatory student fees to fund speech
with which they disagreed).
163
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (Christian student publication
sought student fee funding).
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considered to be part of a pool of student money to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers, and “are not considered part
of a university’s discretionary funds.”164 The majority’s analysis in the
Hosty decision en banc cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Rosenberger, for example, where the high court held that
the First Amendment prohibits a public university from denying
funding to a student publication because of its religious or political
message.165 Under the majority’s analysis in Hosty, the university in
Rosenberger could demand both the right to review the Christian
student publication at issue and to censor its religious contents “once
the publication accepted any funding.”166 However, this is not what the
Supreme Court held in Rosenberger, and thus evinces how the Seventh
Circuit misconstrued the high court’s precedent in the Hosty decision
en banc.
B. The Hosty decision en banc undermines “prior restraint”
jurisprudence.
In concluding that Dean Carter is entitled to qualified immunity
for ordering the printer to stop publishing the Innovator, the Seventh
Circuit has further undermined the long-standing, widely-accepted
premise that prior restraints are repugnant to the basic values of our
society.167 As the dissent of the decision en banc explained, the law
prior to Hazelwood consistently established that university officials
164

Brief for The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Supp. for
Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct. 1330
(No. 05-377) (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. 217; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819).
165
See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
166
. Brief for Student Press Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition of Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba for Writ of
Certiorari, 126 S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377)
167
See Answer of Student Press Law Center and Amici Listed on Reverse Side
as Amici Curiae in Response to Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter’s Petition for
Rehearing with Suggestions for Rehearing en Banc, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003)
(No. 01-4155); Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and
Support for Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126
S.Ct. 1330 (No. 05-377).
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could not require prior review of student media; and the law after
Hazelwood did not change this well-established rule.168 The U.S.
Supreme Court has steadily held that prior restraints on expression are
presumptively unconstitutional,169 and the courts have long equated
and analyzed state-mandated prepublication reviews as prior
restraints.170 The Supreme Court has moreover asserted that public
officers, like the GSU administrators, “whose character and conduct
remain open to debate and free discussion in the press, [must] find
their remedies . . . under libel laws providing for redress and
punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain publication.”171
Contrary to the majority’s logic in the Hosty decision en banc,
Hazelwood was not generally understood to grant officials the
authority to regulate college student media, at the time when Dean
Carter ordered the Innovator’s printer to stop the presses;172 and Dean
Carter, or anyone in a similar position of authority, would have
reasonably understood such an action to constitute an impermissible
168

Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2005) en banc
(Evans, J. dissenting).
169
See Neb. Free Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“prior
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights”); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713,
717 (1971) (“Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the
view that the press must be left to publish the news . . . without censorship,
injunction or prior restraints”); Near v. State of Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931)
(“[I]t has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of
the [First Amendment’s] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication”).
170
See Answer of Student Press Law Center and Amici Listed on Reverse
Side as Amici Curiae in Response to Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter’s Petition
for Rehearing with Suggestions for Rehearing en Banc, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003)
(No. 01-4155) (citing Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F. 2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (rule
prohibiting students from distributing any publication on school grounds without
prior approval of superintendent violated First Amendment)).
171
Near v. State of Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 718-19 (1931).
172
See Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Support
for Academic Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 126 S.Ct.
1330 (No. 05-377) (explaining that even the “most comprehensive text dealing with
higher education law does not even mention Hazelwood as a case that is applicable”
to college student media).
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prior restraint. In addition, as the Dean of Student Affairs and
Services, Carter would have been reasonably informed of the GSU
policy “that each funded publication ‘will determine content and
format . . . without censorship or advance approval.’”173 Yet, despite
the rather obvious warnings that her actions were improper, the Hosty
decision en banc granted qualified immunity to Dean Carter upon the
arguably faulty premise that she could not have known that she was
acting improperly in issuing her directive for mandatory
prepublication review of the contents of the GSU student
newspaper.174
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s extension of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Hazelwood decision was an extreme step for the court to take, absent
more direction from the Supreme Court, and in light of contrary
decisions from several circuit courts. Even though the Supreme Court
has recently declined to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision en banc,
Hosty v. Carter is still worthy of critical and cautious acceptance from
the legal community. The decision en banc conflicts with the
Hazelwood interpretations of several circuit courts, preemptively
extends the Hazelwood holding to college student media, and runs
contrary to the spirit of Supreme Court precedent.
As a result of the Hosty litigation, the Innovator no longer
publishes at Governor’s State University or in any other forum,175 and
with the Seventh Circuit’s Hazelwood interpretation still intact, it will
not be surprising if the presses of other collegiate newspapers are
likewise forced to shut down. For now, the only choice that college
student journalists have is to petition their administrations to explicitly
declare that their student publications operate as fully public fora, so
173

Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 737 (Evans, J. dissenting) (quoting the
Communications Media Board’s policy statement).
174
Id. at 739.
175
First Amendment Center, Full 7th Circuit upholds college against
newspaper, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=15452 (last visited
April 14, 2006).
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as to protect themselves from Hosty’s questionable forum analysis and
suspect extension of Hazelwood’s standard for evaluating censorship
claims in the university context.
As a consequence of the Hosty decision en banc, the law
regarding the censorship of college student media remains unclear in
the Seventh Circuit. Thus, without further direction from the Supreme
Court, courts throughout the country will inevitably muddle the
Hazelwood analysis in future applications and misapplications of this
factually-distinct, high school-specific Supreme Court decision.
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